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ARTICLE
The Case for an Information-Forcing
Regulatory Definition of “Nanomaterials”
DAVID A. DANA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The definitional problem of nanomaterials—namely, what
exactly are nanomaterials with regard to regulation—has
attracted relatively little attention from academics. Nonetheless,
the definitional problem is certainly important: the scope of the
definition or definitions may well dictate what uses of
nanomaterials and risks from them come to be known by the
public at all, and also may dictate how well regulatory agencies
address risks once they are known. More than that, the issues
raised by the project of formulating regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials are ones that are at the core of regulatory debates
that extend far beyond nanomaterials, however defined. If we
“get it right” with nanomaterials, we thus may have a model for
defining other emerging technologies.
At first blush, however, the question of how we define
nanomaterials for purposes of health, safety, and environmental
regulatory regimes may seem like a hyper-technical question of
limited interest, at least to non-scientists. Consider, for example,
a recent definition adopted by the Europe Commission:
“Nanomaterial” means a natural, incidental or manufactured
material containing particles, in an unbound state or as an
aggregate or as an agglomerate and where, for 50% or more of
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the particles in the number size distribution, one or more
external dimensions is in the size range 1 nm – 100 nm.1

This sentence that the European Commission put together is not
exactly suggestive of anything interesting to a non-technical
audience (or perhaps any audience). But in reality, how we will
and should define nanomaterials for regulatory purposes is not
simply a technical matter. It cannot be purely dictated by
science, although it should be informed by it. Rather, the
definitional debate regarding nanomaterials has a great deal to
do with the relationship between government and industry, the
pervasive problem of how to manage uncertainty as to risk, and
the need for institutional structures that can be stable enough to
garner political legitimacy but that are nimble enough to evolve
along with changes in technology and in the understanding of
risks from technology. In other words, the project of defining
nanotechnology raises the same issues as regulation generally.
This Article reviews regulatory attempts to define
nanomaterials to date, including the European Commission’s
definition. It then sets forth and explains why agencies should
adopt what I am calling an information-forcing definition of
nanomaterials. Nanomaterials implicate the same informational
problem as many other substances or practices that are the
subject of political and legal debate: that is, we (the public) know
enough to know that there are some risks but not enough to
specify and assess those risks. We know risks are posed by some
kinds of small-scale materials in some contexts, but not enough is
known to define the universe of which particular materials pose
risk and which do not (or how much risk is posed by those
materials that do pose risk). Regulators, therefore, do not know
enough to specify the health and environmental risks from
nanomaterials with any precision. Regulatory definitions are,
therefore, needed that facilitate the production and sharing by
industry of information about the small-scale materials they use,
why they use them, and what behaviors those materials exhibit
that may translate into human health and/or ecological risk. The
1. Commission Recommendation of 18 October 2011 on the Definition of
Nanomaterial, 2011 O.J. (L 275) 38-40 [hereinafter Definition of Nanomaterial],
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
32011H0696:EN:NOT .
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regulatory definitions should be structured so as not only to force
information from industry, but also to force, or at least encourage,
agencies not to give in to powerful forces of bureaucratic inertia
and stick with regulatory definitions even after emerging science
and other public information suggest they are obsolete.
II. A DEFINITION THAT DOES NOT WORK:
CHEMICAL IDENTITY
It may be helpful to begin by addressing three terms:
nanotechnology,
nanoparticles,
and
nanomaterials.
Nanotechnology generally refers to the industry involved in
manufacturing or using nanomaterials in some way; the term
encompasses both techniques to create and manage
nanomaterials and nanomaterials themselves.2 Nanomaterials
contain one or more nanoparticles.3 A nanoparticle is a single
particle at the “nano” scale, which in the conventional scientific
discourse, means that a particle has at least one external
dimension that is less than one hundred nanometers in length.4
A substance or material may consist of particles of different sizes,
some arguably “nano” and others not. One question is whether a
material containing some nanoparticles (however defined) should
be considered a nanomaterial, and when. How much of a
material has to consist of nanoparticles in order for it to be a
nanomaterial? And should it matter whether the nanoparticles
are tightly bound to other particles, not that tightly bound, or
essentially unbound?
However one answers these questions, the definition of
nanomaterial builds on the definition of nanoparticle, so an
essential task is to define “nanoparticle.” Again, for conventional
scientific discourse, there is an answer—a particle with one
dimension measuring less than one hundred nanometers in
length.5 In other words, a particle with at least one very tiny
2. What Is Nanotechnology?, NANO.GOV, http://www.nano.gov/nanotech101/what/definition (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
3. EUR. AGENCY FOR SAFETY & HEALTH AT WORK, WORKPLACE EXPOSURE TO
NANOPARTICLES 7 (June 3, 2009), available at http://osha.europa.eu/en/
publications/literature_reviews/workplace_exposure_to_nanoparticles.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id.
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dimension. However, the conventional scientific definition does
not tell us what should be the regulatory definition. To the
extent we want particular regulatory attention to nanoparticles,
or more broadly nanomaterials containing nanoparticles, we do
not necessarily want to employ the conventional scientific
definition unless that definition captures a category of materials
that poses some particular risk.
Nonetheless, the scientific literature does not make, let alone
support, that claim. Scientists use a conventional definition of
nanoparticle simply as a descriptive convenience. The scientific
studies of nanoparticles (as per the conventional definition)
suggest that some of them may have adverse health and
environmental effects depending on the composition, size, shape,
configuration, coating, and contextual application or use, as well
as other factors that distinguish one nanoparticle or material
from another.6 There is enough evidence to conclude that certain
nanoparticles in certain contexts pose risks, but there is by no
means evidence to suggest that most or all do.7 Moreover, even
with respect to those nanomaterials that have received the most
attention, such as certain carbon nanotubes, we have an
incomplete characterization of the risks.8
An initial response to the calls for regulatory attention to
nanoparticles was to sidestep altogether the issue of definition
and size and focus instead on the chemical identity of substances
at the nanoscale.9 In this view, a nanoparticle or nanomaterial
does not require attention as a new subject of regulatory inquiry
as long as the molecular identity of the substances at the
nanoscale is no different from that of other substances that have
already been reviewed and essentially approved for unrestricted

6. Id. at 5.
7. See id.
8. For discussions of what is known and not known about nanomaterials,
see Kimberly A. Gray, Five Myths About Nanotechnology in the Current Public
Policy Debate, in THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS (David A. Dana ed., 2011).
9. EUR. AGENCY FOR SAFETY & HEALTH AT WORK, supra note 3, at 49; see also
U.S. EPA, TSCA INVENTORY STATUS OF NANOSCALE SUBSTANCES–GENERAL
APPROACH (2008), available at http://epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmsp-inventorypaper
2008.pdf.
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use by regulators.10 For example, if a substance contains
nanoparticles of silver, the substance would be considered
unproblematic as long as non-nano (“bulk” or “coarse”) versions of
substances made of silver have been deemed acceptable without
regulatory restriction.11
As an example of this approach, consider guidance offered by
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
2008 regarding the status of “nanoscale substances” under the
Toxic Substances Control Act:
EPA has not used particle size to distinguish substances that are
known to have the same molecular identity for the purposes of
the TSCA Inventory. In determining whether a nanoscale
substance is a new or existing chemical, the Agency intends to
continue to apply its current Inventory approaches based on
molecular identity, rather than focus on physical attributes such
as particle size. . . . Although a nanoscale substance that has the
same molecular identity as a non-nanoscale substance listed on
the Inventory differs in particle size . . . EPA considers the two
forms to be the same chemical substance because they have the
same molecular identity.12

While this approach had an obvious appeal to regulators
seeking not to become entangled in the potentially very
complicated regulatory project of dealing with nanomaterials, it
meant that nothing would be done about nanoparticles that posed
risks precisely because they were nanoscale materials. The
principal motivation behind the calls for regulatory frameworks
for nanomaterials—and hence the need for a regulatory definition
of nanomaterials—relates to the possibility that their small size
may result in behavior that could pose a risk to human health or
the environment. As the report of the European Union’s Joint
Research Center describes, there seem to be two distinct concerns
related to size.13 One concern is that very small materials may be
10.
11.
12.
13.

TSCA INVENTORY STATUS, supra note 9.
See id.
Id. at 5-6.
See EUROPEAN UNION: JOINT RESEARCH CTR., CONSIDERATIONS ON A
DEFINITION OF NANOMATERIAL FOR REGULATORY PURPOSES (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_reference_report_201007_nanomaterial
s.pdf [hereinafter JRC REPORT].
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harmful simply because of where they may travel.14 The
materials in very small form may be able to permeate barriers in
the human body or other natural systems that were not designed
to protect against such small materials, and these materials thus
may enter into areas (such as the human brain) where they could
cause harm.15 This concern does not appear to be inherently
limited to materials that are one hundred nanometers or less, and
could, depending on the context or environment in which the
material would be introduced, be implicated by larger
materials.16
The second concern is that at very small sizes, the laws of
physics apply to particles differently and hence very small
particles can display novel properties that are not found in “bulk”
or “coarse” versions of the same elements or chemical
compositions.17 While novel properties can be good and indeed
explain why investments are made to create nanoparticles and
nanomaterials, what may be a good or benign property in some
contexts could be risky in others. In addition, materials that
have some desirable, selected-for novel properties could have
other undesirable, not-understood, not-selected-for novel
properties. From the perspective of either concern, it is not
relevant that the molecular identity of a substance at the nanoscale is identical to that of a bulk substance that has been
determined by regulators as not posing risks warranting
regulatory attention.18
14. Id. at 7.
15. See, e.g., Ben Harder, Conduit to the Brain: Particles Enter the Nervous
System Via The Nose, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 24, 2004, http://www.sciencenews.org/
view/generic/id/4660/title/Conduit_to_the_Brain_Particles_enter_the_nervous_s
ystem_via_the_nose. According to Dr. Denison of Environmental Defense, the
"surprising results" in these studies of nanoparticles include that "[t]hey can
cross from the lung, when inhaled, directly into our blood." Environmental and
Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Science, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of Richard A. Denison,
Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense).
16. JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 26.
17. See id.
18. The novelty of behavior at the nanoscale also helps explain why one
cannot dismiss nanomaterials as posing de minimis risks on the grounds that
the mass of these materials is so modest as to make them an unproblematic
addition to human or non-human ecological systems. At the nanoscale, surface
area, charge, and reactivity may be much more important than mass. See, e.g.,
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III. THE CURRENT DEFINITION DEBATE
Recent efforts at defining nanomaterials for regulatory
purposes in the United States and Europe suggest several
different choices that regulators face in addressing
nanomaterials. These include:
 Whether to offer a firm definition of nanomaterials as a
category at all or simply choose not to have a regulatory
definition for the category;
 Whether to focus on all substances at the nanoscale or only
those that are “engineered,” that is, that are not “natural;”
 Whether to focus solely on an “objective,” physical definition
of nanomaterial or a “subjective,” functional, novelproperties-oriented definition;
 Within the scope of the physical definition, whether to
contain the scope to the conventional scientific definition of
1 to 100 nanometers, and whether to extend the definition to
a material containing any nanoparticle or to limit the
definition to material containing a threshold amount or
proportion of nanoparticles; and
 Whether the definition of nanomaterials should vary by the
extent and intensity of likely human exposure to the
materials.
Each of these points of contention, or possible contention, is
briefly reviewed.
M.E.J. PRONK ET AL., NANOMATERIALS UNDER REACH: NANOSILVER AS A CASE
STUDY 17 (2009), available at
http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten
/601780003.pdf. Mass-based definitions also are insensitive to context: even a
very light substance that is so small as to lodge in sensitive parts of the human
body (such as the brain) that usually block out intruding substances may
warrant attention. For these reasons, mass- or volume-based regulatory
regimes, such as the E.U.’s REACH, unless modified, arguably do not properly
address nanomaterials. In the E.U.’s REACH, in the context of bulk industrial
chemicals, there is an implicit exclusion from registration requirements for any
chemicals for which less than a ton is produced or imported annually in the E.U.
Despite its one ton per year threshold, the European Commission since at least
December 2006 has expressed the view that REACH encompasses materials
produced at the nano-scale that do not meet that threshold. See Lynn L.
Bergeson, REACH and Nano (May 23, 2007), http://nanotech.lawbc.com/2007/05/
articles/international/reach-and-nano/.
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A. To Define or Not Define
In practice, many regulatory agencies in the United States
and elsewhere have chosen not to address nanomaterials as a
category and hence have avoided the definitional question,
despite the fact that nanomaterials are an issue that is clearly
part of the scientific and public policy discourse. One reason
agencies may have chosen not to define nanomaterials is that
their leadership does not believe a definition for the category
would be useful, at least given the current limited scientific
understanding of the behavior of nanoscale materials. Another
reason may be that business entities are lobbying quietly, or not
so quietly lobbying, in support of that view. One commentator
closely linked to what might be termed the nanotechnology
industry has suggested this explanation:
Many government agencies have been reluctant to define terms
pertinent to this emerging technology in the absence of additional
data and information recognizing that the consequence of noncompliance with a regulatory mandate invites monetary and
other unintended consequences. . . . The reason why many
regulatory agencies have been reluctant to embrace definitions
for regulatory purposes is that many believe a one-size-fits-all
approach is scientifically indefensible and likely to do more harm
than good. The debate will continue for some time. In the
interim, stakeholders need to remain vigilant in monitoring
global initiatives and try as best as possible to encourage
regulatory agencies to define no term prematurely or
inappropriately. The consequences of a rush to judgment will not
help advance regulatory goals, may well confuse an already
muddled area, and compromise the commercialization of a
promising technology.19

The United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
come close to advocating a non-definition definition of
nanomaterials, and hence has placed itself somewhere toward the
do not define end of the define/do not define debate. Under FDA’s
approach, in considering whether a product contains
19. Lynn L. Bergeson, To Define or Not to Define: The War of Words,
NANOTECHNOLOGY NOW, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.nanotech-now.com/columns/?
article=572.
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nanomaterials, the agency will consider both objective physical
criteria, specifically size, and novel properties associated with
risks regardless of size.20 However, there is no definitive
commitment as to what FDA will treat as a nanomaterial or
product containing nanomaterials. Thus, according to draft
guidance:
When considering whether an FDA-regulated product contains
nanomaterials or otherwise involves the application of
nanotechnology, FDA will ask: 1. Whether an engineered
material or end product has at least one dimension in the
nanoscale range (approximately 1 nm to 100 nm); or 2. Whether
an engineered material or end product exhibits properties or
phenomena, including physical or chemical properties or
biological effects, that are attributable to its dimension(s), even if
these dimensions fall outside the nanoscale range, up to one
micrometer.21

Consistent with the tentative “when considering” and “will
ask” language, FDA also affirms that:
FDA has not to date established regulatory definitions of
“nanotechnology,” “nanoscale” or related terms. . . . Based on
FDA’s current scientific and technical understanding of
nanomaterials and their characteristics, FDA believes that
evaluations of safety, effectiveness or public health impact of
such products should consider the unique properties and
behaviors that nanomaterials may exhibit. 22

20. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
CONSIDERING WHETHER AN FDA-REGULATED PRODUCT INVOLVES THE APPLICATION
OF NANOTECHNOLOGY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY III(A) (2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm257698.htm.
21. Id.; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY OF NANOMATERIALS IN COSMETIC
PRODUCTS II (2012), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Cosmetics/Guidance
ComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/ucm300886.htm
(adopting same language). For an approving discussion of the FDA approach,
see Andrew Maynard, A Nanotechnology Regulation Hat Trick From the US
Federal Government, 2020 SCIENCE, June 10, 2011, http://2020science.org/2011
/06/10/a-nanotechnology-regulation-hat-trick-from-the-us-federal-government/.
22. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 20, at III.
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The upshot of the FDA approach may be “we know it when we see
it.” This approach assumes that regulated entities should and
will fully consult with the agency to discuss whether a product
may contain nanomaterials and whether that requires additional
regulatory review; according to FDA’s Commissioner, “industry
and developers should keep both of these broad size- and
property-related factors in mind when considering whether their
products might fall within FDA’s attention for nanomaterials and
are encouraged to consult with the agency early in their
The
development process to resolve any uncertainties.”23
responsibility for bringing materials to FDA’s attention thus rests
with business entities that make products subject to FDA
approval. (As I suggest below, that assumption of industry
eagerness to consult of its own accord, on its own initiative, may
be unrealistic.)
What is the case for not defining nanomaterials as a
regulatory category? The best answer to that question has been
provided by Andrew Maynard, a leading scholar on the risks
posed by and regulation of nanotechnology, and a person who
cannot at all be characterized as simply advocating for industry
interests. His argument appears to be that general regulatory
definitions for nanomaterials may result in both over-regulation
and under-regulation, and hence a specific regulatory definition
of nanomaterials is undesirable.24
He believes that many
nanomaterials, defined by any plausible size criteria, do not all—
or even almost all—pose risks based on the available and evolving
scientific evidence.25 Thus, any nanomaterials definition will be
too broad and taint many materials that pose no risk.
Conversely, any definition of nanomaterials will leave out some
specific materials where dimension-related effects pose risks.
Maynard suggests we should not seek to define and regulate
nanomaterials as such, but take each material and product
containing nanoscale materials as a unique case within a unique
context and evaluate that case based on a range of factors that
the available science suggests may be relevant:
23. Margaret A. Hamburg, FDA’s Approach to Regulation of Products of
Nanotechnology, 336 SCIENCE 299 (2012).
24. Maynard, supra note 21.
25. Id. at 2.
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With policy-makers looking for clear definitions on which to build
“nano-regulations,” there is a growing danger of science being
pushed aside. . . . But it is becoming clear that many parameters
other than size modulate risk, including particle shape, porosity,
surface area and chemistry. Some of these parameters become
more relevant at smaller scales—but not always. The transition
from “conventional” to “unconventional” behaviour, when it does
occur, depends critically on the particular material and the
context. A “one size fits all” definition of nanomaterials will fail to
capture what is important for addressing risk.26

B. Engineered or Not
Almost all proposed regulatory definitions of nanoparticles or
nanomaterials limit the scope of the category to substances that
are engineered, meaning manufactured, by human effort. That
nanomaterials for regulatory purposes be engineered at the
nanoscale is important for several reasons. First, because an
entity is unlikely to engineer something at the nanoscale unless
the material is expected to have novel properties, engineered
materials are likely to display novel properties.27 It is precisely
such materials that implicate the concerns about unusual particle
behavior that motivate the calls for the development of a
regulatory framework for nanomaterials. Materials that are
produced at a nanoscale inadvertently or by accident, or simply as
a byproduct of the achievement of a goal unrelated to the
nanoscale materials, are less likely to be characterized by novel
properties.
That said, there are difficulties in tying a regulatory
definition to a concept of “engineered” because it can be hard to
know what is precisely meant by the concept, at least in the
absence of a clear definition. Does engineered production include
production where the manufacturer reasonably should have
known it was creating a nanoscale material but for whatever
reason did not know? Does intentional production, for example,

26. Andrew Maynard, Don’t Define Nanomaterials, 475 NATURE 31 (2011)
(Maynard had previously advocated for the regulatory definition of
nanomaterials).
27. DAVID A. DANA, THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS FOR UNCERTAIN RISKS 112 (2012).
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include the production of a nanoscale material that is an
incidental byproduct of the production of another non-nanoscale
material if the manufacturer is in fact aware of the byproduct and
its nanoscale dimensions?28
These difficulties in defining what engineered means could
explain why, in contrast to other regulatory authorities, the
European Commission has excluded “engineered” or even
“intentionally produced” from its proposed definition of
According to the European Commission’s
nanomaterials.29
recommendation, its definition of nanomaterials “covers natural,
incidental or manufactured materials.”30
C. “Objective” Physical or Subjective “Functional”
Criteria or Both?
Assuming that an agency accepts the need to define
nanomaterials as a distinct category, and even assuming it limits
that category to engineered materials, there remains the question
of what criteria will be used to distinguish nanomaterials from all
other materials. One difference in proposed definitions has to do
with whether the definition should track physical criteria that in
theory might be specifically measurable and hence, in a limited
sense, objective. Size is the most obvious such criteria, and so far
the only one included in any of the proposed definitions.31 The
28. There is a strong case for carving out an exception to the regulatory
definition for nanomaterials for those materials that were in production and use
long before the last twenty years and the emergence of nanotechnology as a
distinct field. For these historically-produced and long-used materials, there is
no reason–and indeed no suggestion by anyone in the literature–that such
materials pose possible environmental, health, or safety risks. These historical
materials include carbon black and a variety of materials used in food
production, including the production of homogenized milk and mayonnaise.
Although some or all of these materials might be excluded by a definition of
nanomaterials that requires that nanomaterials have been “engineered,” as the
JRC Report suggests that is not obviously the case; so an explicit exclusion for
materials produced prior to a plausible date (e.g. 1980 or 1990) might be
preferable. JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.2.6.
29. Cf. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1.
30. Id. The Danish Ministry of Environment definition also includes no
reference to the concepts of intentionality/engineered/manufactured, although
even that definition suggests that nanomaterials must be “produced” or “made”
as opposed to being naturally occurring. JRC REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.3.3.
31. See Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1.
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alternative to the objective, physical approach would be an
approach that defines nanomaterials based on whether or how
much they exhibit novel properties associated with having one or
more nano dimensions. This “novel properties” approach might
be regarded as more subjective because it is, to an extent,
subjective what constitutes a “novel” property in any particular
case. As one commentator explained:
While the “novel properties” concept rests at the center of worldwide interest in nanotechnology, it also presents materials
characterization and regulatory problems. What exactly are these
“novel properties,” how are they defined, are they consistent from
one type of nanomaterial to the next, do they vary in intensity
under certain circumstances, and are they measurable and
capable of standardization? If not, how are we going to handle
this aspect of the definition when it comes to materials
characterization projects and/or regulations? Scientists–not
lawyers–will have to answer these questions, of course.32

This subjectivity could allow manufacturers to plausibly claim
that they did not know certain materials qualify as
nanomaterials, and hence could allow them to refrain from
disclosing those materials to regulators. The possibility of
nondisclosure on the part of manufacturers is heightened by the
fact that the subjective approach also requires a great deal of
information about the material—information about how the
material “behaves” in different contexts—that most often is
unavailable to regulators and the broader public. Conversely,
subjectivity creates the possibility that manufacturers will lack
the notice they deserve ex ante, when they are developing
materials and/or products, that they will be subject to the
regulatory definition of nanomaterials and any attendant
regulatory requirements.
The attraction of a subjective approach is that it ties the
definition more closely to a main source of risks associated with
the nanoscale, that is, that otherwise benign materials may
behave in novel ways that require regulatory consideration when
those materials are configured at the nanoscale. Because novel
32. John C. Monica, Jr., “Novel Properties” Dilemma, NANO L. REP., Mar. 6,
2007, http://www.nanolaw report.com/2007/03/#axzz2IitL7abh.
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properties are directly tied to one of the main reasons we believe
nanomaterials may pose risks to human health and the
environment, a definition that directly references novel properties
might be thought to be more functionally related to the animating
goals of defining nanomaterials and, in that sense, less
mechanical and more sophisticated than the objective, physical
approach.
We observe two approaches in proposed regulatory
definitions of nanomaterials. In one approach, only objective,
physical criteria are referenced. This is the approach most
definitive of the European Commission, which has expressly
recommended that only size be considered in defining what is a
In a proposal regarding nanomaterials in
nanomaterial.33
pesticides under FIFRA, EPA opted for an objective, physical
approach, explaining that, in its view, relying on “novel
properties” in the context of a regulatory definition was
unworkable:
These elements[, novel properties and unconventional behavior of
materials,] do not readily work in a regulatory context because of
the high degree of subjectivity involved with interpreting such
phrases as “unique or novel properties” or “manufactured or
engineered to take advantage of these properties.” Moreover, the
contribution of these subjective elements to risk has not been
established. Instead, OPP will focus on more objective criteria in
describing when information about a “nanoscale material” in a
pesticide product may be relevant to determining whether the
product has an unreasonable adverse environmental effect.
Specifically, such information may be relevant in this context
when the active or inert ingredient and any component parts
thereof is intentionally produced to have at least one dimension
that measures between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers,
regardless of the aggregation or agglomeration state of the final
material.34

33. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1.
34. Policies Concerning Products Containing Nanoscale Materials, 76 Fed.
Reg. 35383-01, 35387 (proposed June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
In October 2010, EPA submitted a proposed TSCA revision to OMB that also
reportedly follows an objective, physical approach. Under this proposal, any
chemical substance from 1 to 100 nanometers will be subject to TSCA’s
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In the second approach, there is an objective, physical definition
of nanomaterial and then a second, subjective, functional
definition that applies even when the objective, physical criteria
are inapplicable.35 This approach, a kind of catch-all approach, is
what Canada’s regulators have proposed. According to the
Canadian definition, any manufactured substance or product and
any component material, ingredient, device, or structure is a
nanomaterial if “[i]t is at or within the nanoscale in at least one
external dimension [1 to 100 nanometers]” or “[i]t is smaller or
larger than the nanoscale in all dimensions and exhibits one or
more nanoscale properties/phenomena,” where “nanoscale
properties/phenomena” “means properties which are attributable
to size and their effects,” and that “are distinguishable from the
chemical or physical properties of individual atoms, individual
molecules and bulk material. . . .”36 Although this definition
employs “nanoscale properties” instead of novel properties, it
raises the same question of subjectivity, that is, is there and can
there be a firm guide telling a manufacturer in a specific case
whether its material has or does not have a nanoscale property?
In theory, one could imagine a third approach—one in which
nanomaterials are solely defined by whether they exhibit novel
properties associated with dimension or size, regardless of their
actual size. Some might think such a subjective, although
appealingly functional, approach would be unworkable, for
reasons already suggested; and indeed one might argue that in
practice this approach would mean no actual definition of
nanomaterials as a distinct category. While no agency has
proposed this approach, a Whitehouse/OMB guidance document
comes close to suggesting as much: “[f]or oversight and regulation
. . . the critical issue is whether and how . . . altered properties

Significant New Use Rule (SNUR). “This regulatory revision treats the
nanomaterial as a new chemical and requires submission of data to EPA at least
90 days prior to commencing manufacture of these types of materials.” U.S.
EPA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA NEEDS TO MANAGE NANOMATERIAL RISKS
MORE EFFECTIVELY: REP. NO. 12-P-0162, 4 (2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/ reports/2012/20121229-12-P-0162.pdf.
35. See HEALTH CANADA, POLICY STATEMENT ON HEALTH CANADA’S WORKING
DEFINITION FOR NANOMATERIAL (2011), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/srsr/pubs/nano/ pol-eng.php.
36. Id.
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and phenomena emerging at the nanoscale create or alter the
risks and benefits of a specific application,” and thus “[a] focus on
novel properties and phenomena observed in nanomaterials may
ultimately be more useful than a categorical definition based on
size alone.”37
D. How Small and How Many Particles
The final debate among the proposed regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials has to do with the exact specifications for size
criteria. As already noted, one dimension of 1 to 100 nanometers
in length is a conventional scientific definition of the nanoscale,
and almost all proposed regulatory definitions incorporate that
scale. However, a few proposed definitions contemplate a scale of
up to 1,000 nanometers.38 There would appear to be no inherent
significance in 100 nanometers as a defining upper limit, but it is
not obvious that there is anything inherently significant about
the largest upper figure that has been suggested, 1,000
nanometers, either. There is some suggestion in the literature
that we see the most novel properties at a scale well below 100
nanometers,39 but an essential truth of this whole area is that
there is a great deal unknown, and there is a great deal of

37. JOHN P. HOLDEN ET AL., POLICY PRINCIPLES IN THE U.S. DECISION-MAKING
CONCERNING REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF APPLICATIONS OF NANOTECHNOLOGY
AND NANOMATERIALS (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/inforeg/for-/nanotechnology-regulation-and-oversight
principles.pdf.
38. The JCR Report suggests an upper limit of 1,000 nm. The National
Organics Standards Board Materials Committee, convened under the authority
of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a recent statement (February 25,
2010) has suggested an upper limit of 300 nm. In 2010, the U.K. House of Lords
Science and Technology Committee suggested 1,000 nm. SCI. & TECH. COMM.,
NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND FOOD, 2010, H.L. 22-I, ¶ 5(24) (U.K.). The California
Safer Consumer Product Alternatives Act similarly proposes a nanoscale
between 1-1,000 nanometers.
For a discussion of the arguments and
suggestions for a 1,000 upper threshold, see CANADA ENVTL. LAW ASS’N,
RESPONSE TO INTERIM STATEMENT ON HEALTH: CANADA’S WORKING DEFINITION
FOR NANOMATERIALS 8-9 (2010), available at http://www.cela.ca/publications/
response-interim-policy-statement-nano materials.
39. Mélanie Auffan et al., Toward a Definition of Inorganic Nanoparticles
From an Environmental, Health and Safety Perspective, 4 NATURE
NANOTECHNOLOGY 634 (2009).
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diversity and difference among particles and materials even of
the same rough size.
A related debate is whether “nanomaterials” should include
any material that includes any nanoparticle or only materials
including some percentage of nanoparticles. Many substances
contain particles of a range of sizes, some of which are arguably
“nano,” and many of which are not. Most of the proposed
regulatory definitions to date seem to suggest that a material or
substance containing any nanoparticle is itself a nanomaterial,
but the European Commission recommends that a material be
classified as a nanomaterial only if fifty percent or more of its
particles are nanoscale.40 But even the Commission qualifies this
limitation by providing that a threshold lower than fifty percent
may be appropriate on a case-by-case basis.41
E. Likely Exposure As Part of The Definitions
Regulators may never know exactly how dangerous or not
dangerous any given nanomaterial (however defined) may be for
human beings who come into contact with the material. But even
for materials where there is genuine uncertainty as to how the
substance will behave, it may be possible to at least estimate how
many people could be adversely affected assuming, on a
precautionary basis, that the material can adversely affect
human health. Some nanomaterials are and will be used in food
or toothpaste or nasal sprays, all of which involve intense human
exposure to potentially millions of people, including vulnerable
populations. Other materials will be used in (for example) tennis
rackets and tires, both of which involve less intense human
exposure, and still others will be used in medical treatments that
are designed for use on only a few hundred people per year. From
a precautionary perspective, in the face of uncertainty about each
particular material, it might make sense to define nanomaterials
more expansively in realms where intense, mass human exposure
is very likely and less expansively where that is less likely. Thus,

40. Definition of Nanomaterial, supra note 1.
41. Id. (“In specific cases and where warranted by concerns for the
environment, health, safety or competitiveness the number size distribution
threshold of 50% may be replaced by a threshold between 1 and 50%.”).
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it might make sense for the definition of nanomaterials for foods
regulated by the FDA and pesticides regulated under FIFRA to
extend up to 1,000 nanometers.
By contrast, when a material is not being produced for use in
a mass market product and/or is intended only for use in an
arena of relatively limited and controlled human exposure, there
may be an argument for the application of a de minimis riskbased exclusion from an otherwise applicable regulatory
definition of nanomaterials.
A nanomaterial that is being
produced in very tiny amounts for use in the construction of
equipment for outer space, for example, could fall in such a de
minimis exception.
However, there are considerable operational difficulties in
implementing an approach that provides for an expansive
regulatory definition based on likely scope of human exposure or
that allows for a de minimis exception based on very limited
likely exposure. For one thing, a material that is initially not
intended for mass marketing or human consumption could be redirected to such uses at a later date; moreover, materials can
come into close human contact through the process of disposal
and subsequent absorption into the environment (e.g., via
leaching into a drinking water supply).42 There are many
possible pathways of exposure with nanomaterials, and there
may be no way to trace pathways in the environment because of
the lack of technology to identify and track such small materials.
A proliferation of different definitions of nanomaterials based
on likely exposure scenarios also works against facilitating
communication and coordination as among different agencies and
offices. At the same time, the fact that most attention to
regulatory definitions of nanomaterials to date has centered
around food, the food chain, and cosmetics implicitly affirms the
view that likelihood of mass human exposure is a highly relevant
variable.43
42. U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 2 (“there also exists the potential for
exposures to nanomaterials during product manufacturing, use and/or at the
end of the product life cycle through recycling, landfills, and waste
incineration.”).
43. The Whitehouse/OMB guidance seems to suggest incorporating exposure
scenarios into regulatory definitions, however. See HOLDEN ET AL., supra note 37.
In other work, I argue that exposure should factor in regulatory definition. See
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IV. A REGULATORY DEFINITION IS NECESSARY
Before addressing what kind of definition agencies should
adopt for nanomaterials, it is important first to explain why
definitions are necessary and not, as Maynard argues,
counterproductive.
Maynard is right that any regulatory
definition or definitions of nanomaterials will include some
materials that pose real risk and others that do not. But that is
not a reason to avoid regulatory definitions of nanomaterials
because defining is the first, not the last, step in a process of
considering what regulatory requirements should apply. An
agency could define a universe of (say) 10,000 nanomaterials and
then proceed to identify only 1,000 that warrant testing or
additional testing, and then based on that testing, apply labeling
or warning requirements to only a handful of the original 10,000.
Maynard seems to suggest that once materials receive
designation as nanomaterials, they will acquire a taint in the
public imagination, and substantive and perhaps unreasonable
regulation of all of them will follow as a political and social
imperative.44 But the opposite is likely true. Public concern
about nanotechnology and nanomaterials is likely to be assuaged
if the public (and in particular relevant NGOs that help shape
public opinion) have reason to think that agencies are taking a
close look at nanotechnology and nanomaterials, even if that
means the agencies’ close look in most cases results in no further
action. And the public may not credit agencies as taking a close
look if agencies lack even a definition of nanomaterials. Indeed,
it is hard to see how not defining nanomaterials will increase
public trust that the government is addressing present and
potential risks posed by nanomaterials.45
Maynard also suggests that regulatory definitions of
nanomaterials might result in regulators not taking a close look
THE NANOTECHNOLOGY CHALLENGE: CREATING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS FOR
UNCERTAIN RISKS (David A. Dana ed., 2012).
44. Maynard, supra note 26.
45. See Jeremy Warren, The EU Definition of Nanomaterials – Getting What
You Wished For, LABORATORY NEWS, June 12, 2012, http://www.labnews.co.uk/
features/eu-definition-nanomaterials-%E2%80%93-wished-for/ (“To gain trust
nanotechnology needs a regulatory framework – but before this can happen we
need to know one thing – just what is a nanomaterial.”).
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at substances or materials outside the definition.46 This point,
however, is better formulated as a critique of too narrow or
inflexible a definition of nanomaterials than as support for having
no definition at all.
Moreover, any regulatory effort at
ascertaining risk and response has to start somewhere and
cannot start everywhere; defining nanomaterials, even defining
them inflexibly by size or largely by size, may be a reasonable
starting point and lay the ground for exploration of risks posed by
materials that are too large or otherwise fall outside the
definition. We see exactly that in the arena of particulate matter
emissions, where EPA has moved beyond regulation of larger
particulate matter to include smaller or fine particulate matter,
as the agency learned more about these emissions.
The need for regulatory definitions is also related to the need
to facilitate communication and learning within an agency and
among agencies. A working definition helps an agency or
agencies identify and build bridges among staff working on issues
or with regard to materials that implicate the nanoscale.
Because there are in fact some common issues and potential for
shared learning about the nanoscale, such identification is
important. Indeed, one of the EPA Inspector General’s (I.G.)
criticisms of the agency’s nanotechnology/nanomaterials efforts to
date is that there has been a lack of coordination and sharing of
information.47 As the I.G. Report explained:
EPA does not have an Agency-wide, formal process to
disseminate manufacturer data. . . . [I]nformation sharing is not
facilitated by a formal process; rather, it depends on personal
relationships between program staff. . . . Coordinated sharing of
nanomaterial data call information will also be important if
additional regulatory actions become necessary. . . . Because of
the growing number of nanomaterial products entering the
marketplace . . . it will become increasingly necessary for these
program offices to share information and coordinate their
efforts.48

46. Maynard, supra note 26.
47. U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 9.
48. Id. at 9-10.
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Having clear regulatory definitions of nanomaterials cannot
create coordination and information-sharing, but it seems
reasonable to assume it can help. The larger point is that
definitions are always imperfect but they nonetheless are
important for establishing a discourse.
A. Agency Definitions Should Be Information-Forcing
That agencies are not operating in some idealized space with
respect to nanomaterials was underscored by the recent EPA
Inspector General report:
At the time of our review, EPA did not have sufficient
information or processes to effectively manage the human health
and environmental risks of nanomaterials. EPA does not have a
formal process to coordinate the dissemination and utilization of
nanomaterial information or communicate nanomaterial risks. . .
. [T]echnological limitations inhibit nanomaterial detection in
the environment, and a reliance on industry data impedes
effective nanomaterial management.49

Regulators do not even have a ready way of knowing what
nanomaterials or arguable nanomaterials are being produced
and/or how they are being deployed.50 Nanoparticles are not
readily visible, and they are not typically listed as distinct
ingredients even on packaged consumer products.51 Moreover,
even when regulators have some idea of the components of a
given product, they may have very little information with which
to assess and evaluate those components, given the newness and
complexity of nanotechnology. Further, because there are an
almost infinite variety of any nanoscale materials and because
the nanotechnology industry and nanoscale materials are fast
evolving, it may be impossible for even the most heroic of

49. Id. at 9.
50. Robin Wilson, Nanotechnology: The Challenge of Regulating Known
Unknowns, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 704, 707 (2006).
51. Nanoparticles Found in 10 Top Brand Cosmetics, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
http://nano.foe.org.au/nanoparticles-found-10-top-brand-cosmetics (last visited
Nov. 15, 2012).
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regulators to keep up.52 Regulators on their own, without the
assistance of industry, cannot have the information they need to
grasp the current state of play in nanotechnology.
The relevant question then is how can agency definitions of
“nanomaterials” be structured so as to maximize the amount of
relevant information they receive regarding nanomaterials and
the possible risks and risks posed by nanomaterials? Given the
lack of information on the part of regulators regarding
nanomaterials, regulatory definitions cannot describe the
contours of risks but rather must be a means of generating the
information needed to assess the contours of risks.
This question calls for a distinction between two kinds of
information. The first is information that industry has or can
readily obtain regarding nanoscale materials it is making or
using, such as the size of those materials or their chemical
identity. The second is information that would require industry
to make some significant investment to generate information
regarding these materials that could be helpful to an
understanding of the risks posed by or not posed by such
materials. The latter category, in many cases, will include
precise assessments of the novelty of behavior of the
nanomaterials in relevant contexts, which itself may require tests
for effects on human health and the environment. While some
companies may perform such testing in the absence of specific
regulatory requirements, there are good reasons to postulate that
many companies do not.
Industry has no strong and consistent incentive to
voluntarily provide regulators with all the relevant information it
possesses. Doing so, industry understands, can lead to costly new
requirements or even product prohibitions. That may explain
why so little information appears to have been produced in
response to EPA’s Voluntary Stewardship program for
nanomaterials.53 And, outside the context of nanomaterials,
52. Nanotechnology Market Forecast to 2014, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 22, 2012,
9:11 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/nanotechnology-market-forecastto-2014-2012-10-22.
53. See EPA’s Voluntary Reporting Program Fails To Deliver Data Needed To
Determine Safety Of Nanomaterials, Report Shows, ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND (Jan.
13,
2009),
http://www.edf.org/news/epas-voluntary-reporting-program-failsdeliver-data-needed-determine-safety-nanomaterials-repor (explaining that EPA
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there is not a long history or clear record of industry actors
making voluntary disclosures to regulators: tobacco companies
certainly did not disclose the information they had that was
relevant to links to cancer until they absolutely were required to
do so.
Thus, although the FDA apparently contemplates
producers of FDA-regulated products to consult with them in an
ongoing and volitional way about nanoscale components in their
products, there are reasons to question whether businesses will
initiate such consultations in the FDA context. Voluntary
consultation, moreover, seems even more unlikely in contexts
where businesses know they are subject to less precautionary
statutory and regulatory authorities than those under which the
FDA operates.
Moreover, industry not only has incentives not to offer up
information to regulators it has or could readily obtain, it also has
reasons not to invest in developing additional information that
would be relevant to risk assessments by regulators.54 There are
strong incentives for industry not to know about potentially risky
aspects of the materials and/or products they make. Knowing
about risk requires a research investment by industry, and any
one company that makes that investment is assuming higher
costs than its competitors who avoid those costs. Moreover, the
investment may only result in greater tort liability down the
road, as well as regulatory penalties for knowingly engaging in
dangerous conduct.55 Ignorance, in other words, is sometimes
and perhaps many times rational.
Ideally, a regulatory definition would do two things. First, it
would effectively compel industry to disclose the information it
already has regarding a set of materials at issue. Second, the
definition would combat the phenomenon of intentional industry
has acknowledged that its voluntary approach has yielded “only limited
information on a small fraction of the hundreds of potentially toxic
nanomaterials”).
54. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the
Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1670-77 (2004); see also Wendy E. Wagner,
When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95
GEO. L.J. 693, 693-95 (2007).
55. See David A. Dana, When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The
Case of Nanomaterials, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 170 (2010).
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ignorance by providing an incentive for industry to generate
additional relevant information and to share that information
with regulators.
Regulatory definitions that do not contain relatively objective
criteria, such as particle size, and that instead only track whether
a material was engineered to behave in “novel” ways, may well
not meet these objectives.
Flexible, subjective, functional
definitions of nanomaterials tied to whether a material displays
novel properties related to size leave enough room for industry
not to disclose what it knows to regulators because what is
covered under such definitions is contestable. “Wiggle room” will
result in the avoidance of disclosure. EPA’s recent endorsement
of objective criteria, from the perspective of the realities of
behavior on the part of regulated entities (at least in the United
States context), makes sense. Functional, subjective definitions
work best under assumptions of eager compliance and openness
that have little grounding in actual practice.
At the same time, objective definitions tied to size or other
similar criteria, while likely to produce information regarding
which products contain nanomaterials based on these criteria, are
not likely by themselves to encourage industry to disclose what it
knows about subjective matters such as “novel properties” or to
invest in obtaining more information about novel properties.
Industry needs an incentive to provide and generate information
that otherwise would offer them no benefit.
One way to incentivize the production and disclosure of such
information would be to add to the definition of nanomaterials a
provision whereby materials that would be included under a size
criteria could be excluded if industry could demonstrate both that
(1) the material, despite its small size, will not be deployed in a
context where the size itself could cause harm, and (2) the
material is not characterized by novel properties that could result
in human health or ecological harm. By rewarding industry with
exclusion from the realm of regulatory definitions and possible
attendant regulatory costs, a definition of nanomaterials similar
to the aforementioned one can address the disincentives for
industry research that are a central problem in regulation. Even
if only some industry participants choose to engage in such a
dialogue with regulators, regulators could learn a great deal
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about nanotechnology and novel properties that they could apply
broadly to their regulatory efforts.56
B. Regulatory Definitions Must Take Account of
Information Staleness
The whole enterprise of regulating nanotechnology—and
hence the included enterprise of defining nanomaterials for
regulatory purposes—ideally would be an exercise in “adaptive
management,” or management that continually adapts to take
account of new information and new insights. It is easy to call for
adaptive management; no one supports non-adaptive
management. But adaptive management always should be
understood as a goal that requires specific encouragement and
support. Regulated entities need some stability to operate, and
stability means some periods of relative non-adaptation; and
regulators, perpetually overworked and overburdened, and at
least somewhat removed from developments in science and
industry, may not engage in even periodic adaptation unless
institutional structures are in place to encourage them to do so.57
Just as industry must be encouraged to provide and generate
information, regulators must be encouraged to seek out and take
account of new information on an ongoing basis and use that new
information to inform regulatory definitions as well as
substantive regulatory requirements.
One institutional means of achieving this goal would be an
agency commitment, ideally formalized in an agency regulation,
to issue a review of its regulatory definition no less than once
every five years, and in which the agency would be required to
explain why it was or was not changing the current regulatory
definition at a minimum of five year intervals. The process of
putting out such a review for notice and comment would help
56. Participation by a few companies might prompt broader participation
because companies would not want the information provided by participants
used against them and their products, and would prefer to have a more active
role in shaping the factual conclusions drawn by the agency. They also might
not want to appear less cooperative than other participants.
57. On regulatory inertia, see David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel,
Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1826 (2008).
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focus debate on developments in nanotechnology that might
justify changes in the regulatory definition of nanomaterials.58
Another way of achieving ongoing adaptation would be to
allow citizens and regulated entities at any time to petition an
agency to include a material or exclude a material, and the
agency could be required to respond to such petitions within a
reasonable time. While an allowance for petitions carries with it
the risk that scarce agency resources will be absorbed by petitions
instead of potentially more important tasks, in terms of health
and the environment, an allowance for petitions fosters the
generation of more data and serves the important values of public
participation and transparency.59
One other possible institutional means of achieving ongoing
adaptation would be the creation of an advisory board to inform
an agency regarding relevant changes in the nanotechnology
industry. If the advisory board was composed of industry,
academic, and NGO representatives, as might be highly desirable
to maximize both informational inputs and enhance public
participation, one issue would be whether such an advisory board
could achieve a consensus. Another issue would be whether the
advisory board’s recommendations would have any influence on
the agency. If the agency were required to review regulatory
definitions every five years and explain why changes were not
needed, the advisory board could be called on to participate in the
review process as part of the governing procedures and the
agency would thus be required to account for the input of the
advisory board.
C. The Value of Information Production is Undermined
by Excessive Confidentiality Restrictions
An
information-forcing
regulatory
definition
of
nanomaterials, and institutional mechanisms to encourage
58. The Clean Air Act has provisions that operate in this way. See 42 U.S.C
§§ 7408, 7409, 7429 (2012).
59. See generally Jennifer Kuzma et al., Evaluating Oversight Systems for
Emerging Technology: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 37
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 546 (2009) (discussing the link between components of the
system of regulatory oversight and public confidence regarding emerging
technologies).
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ongoing collection of information and reformulation of the
regulatory definition, only work if agencies use the information
they receive to the greatest effect. The designation of information
received by an agency as confidential business information works
against that objective in two ways. First, the designations make
it more difficult for the agency to obtain both internal, and even
more so, external assessments of the significance of the
information. Second, and relatedly, the designations make it
difficult for external stakeholders to confirm that the agency is
doing its job in the ways it should, and not ignoring risks due to
negligence or undue external pressure. If external stakeholders
cannot review the data an agency has obtained, the stakeholders
cannot provide nearly as useful input as otherwise would be
possible, and cannot provide meaningful critiques of the agency
that might prompt action. Under current practice at EPA under
TSCA, industry designations of information as confidential
business information have been taken entirely at face value. The
submitting company need not explain why it is claiming the
designation or provide reasons why the designation is
appropriate.60 The result, by all accounts, is a massive overclaiming of the confidential business information designation.61
While this is not a problem in any way limited to nanomaterials,
nanomaterials are a good place to start in rectifying it.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over defining nanomaterials for regulatory
purposes centers on the basic issue of whether a definition is
60. See U.S. EPA, supra note 34, at 5-6 (explaining that the TSCA program,
under which EPA plans to regulate nanomaterials, is “limited by . . . claims of
confidential business information (CBI) on industry data submissions . . . up to
90 percent of TSCA premanufacture notices contain claims of CBI. Excessive
CBI designations inhibit independent peer reviews, oversight by external
parties, and information sharing across EPA offices.”).
61. See, e.g., Assessing the Effectiveness of U.S. Chemical Safety Laws:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works S. Comm. on Superfund,
Toxics & Envtl. Health, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Frances Beinecke,
President, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.) (“TSCA’s Confidential
Business Information (CBI) provisions . . . allows [sic] companies to make nearly
unlimited claims of CBI, without requiring any upfront justification or EPA
review, and without any date of expiration or requirement for periodic renewal
and justification of such claims.”).
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advisable or not, and whether any such definition should be based
on relatively objective physical criteria or more subjective
functional ones.
This Article argues that a definition is
necessary, and that the definition or definitions should be
information-forcing. The definition should be structured so as to
require and encourage industry to generate and disclose relevant
information. The relevant regulatory or statutory provisions
should also encourage regulators to continue to seek and evaluate
new information and use that information to update the
regulatory definitions.
This approach requires that the
regulatory definition include relatively objective physical criteria,
but would also provide for the exclusions from or additions to the
category of nanomaterials based on functional considerations.
Getting regulatory definitions right is a key step in creating
an effective regulatory framework for assessing and managing
the risks posed by nanomaterials, which in turn is essential to
realizing the maximum social benefit of the nanotechnology
revolution.
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